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HOW MUCH WILL IT COST? THE “PRICE” OF 
PHARMACEUTICAL GAG CLAUSES AND WHY THEIR 
PROHIBITION MAY NOT EQUATE TO SAVINGS 
Amy Faye Eng* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Individuals often perceive pharmacists as trustworthy. A pharmacist 
may be responsible for a wide variety of tasks—from keeping a watchful 
eye for erroneous dosing to being a source of knowledge on drug 
interactions or side effects.  Considering the potentially endless list of 
interactions between an individual and a pharmacist, a relationship is likely 
to form over time, which augments the feeling of trust.  Until recently, 
however, there was one thing a pharmacist could not be trusted to do: let 
you know when you are paying “too much” for your prescription 
medication. 
Rhode Island Representative Brian Kennedy found himself in a 
situation shared by many Americans: at the pharmacy picking up a 
prescription.1  The pharmacist filling the prescription happened to be a 
friend of Representative Kennedy and discreetly disclosed to the 
Representative that he would be charged the drug’s retail price as opposed 
to his copay.2  The reason why was simple—the retail price was less than 
the copay. 3  The impact of making such a disclosure was more than just a 
friend looking out for another.  In that single moment, the pharmacist 
committed a major transgression and simultaneously catalyzed the proposal 
of a new piece of Rhode Island legislation, which was later introduced by 
Representative Kennedy.4  The pharmacist, whose identity could not be 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Seton Hall University School of Law, concentration in Health Law; 
B.A., magna cum laude, 2017, Rutgers University.  Special thanks to Professor John Jacobi 
for sharing his endless wisdom and helping bring this Comment to life.  To the pharmacists 
who trusted their stories with a mere law student.  And finally, for my family and friends, 
whose love and support has never wavered (even when I only wanted to speak about gag 
clauses exclusively). 
 1  Elaine S. Povich, There Might Be a Cheaper Drug, But Pharmacists Can’t Tell You 
That, PEW (June 4, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateli 
ne/2018/06/04/there-might-be-a-cheaper-drug-but-pharmacists-cant-tell-you-that. 
 2  Id. 
 3  Id. 
 4  Id. 
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shared due to the possibility of retaliation, had breached a “gag clause.”5 
The healthcare system in the United States is complex, and while 
there are many defining features that make it unlike any other, healthcare in 
the United States is arguably best known for being notoriously expensive.6  
Consequently, pharmaceutical spending comprises a large part.7  To put it 
into perspective, “[t]he United States spends twice as much on healthcare 
as 10 other high-income nations,” which includes countries such as the 
United Kingdom, Switzerland, Canada, and Japan.8  Of all healthcare 
spending in the United States, the pharmaceutical sector compromises 
almost fifteen percent.9  Moreover, prescription drug spending has been on 
the rise in the United States.10  Needless to say, any conversation regarding 
healthcare automatically points to a discussion about the cost of 
pharmaceuticals. 
The high cost of prescription drugs is a continuously raised issue, and 
the need for solutions is never-ending.  Part of what makes the matter so 
pressing is the inability of many Americans to afford their medication.11  In 
 
 5  Id. 
 6  See Margot Sanger-Katz, Why is U.S. Health Care So Expensive? Some of the 
Reasons You’ve Heard Turn Out to Be Myths, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/13/upshot/united-states-health-care-resembles-rest-of-
world.html (“There were two areas where the United States was quite different: We pay 
substantially higher prices for medical services, including hospitalization, doctors’ visits and 
prescription drugs.  And our complex payment system causes us to spend far more on 
administrative costs.”). 
 7  Id. 
 8  Jessica Glenza, Sky-high Prices of Everything Makes US Healthcare the World’s 
Most Expensive, GUARDIAN (Mar. 13, 2018, 4:29 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2018/mar/13/us-healthcare-costs-causes-drug-prices-salaries.  In 2018, healthcare 
spending reached 3.6 trillion dollars, which comes to $11,172 per person.  CMS.GOV: CTR. 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-
Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.html (last visited 
Jan. 16, 2020); Bradley Sawyer & Cynthia Cox, How Does Health Spending in the U.S. 
Compare to Other Countries?, PETERSON KAISER: HEALTH SYS. TRACKER (Dec. 7, 2018),  
https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/health-spending-u-s-compare-
countries/#item-start.  The next highest spending country was Switzerland at $8009 per 
person while every country after that spent roughly half, if not less, than the United States.  
Id. 
 9  Nancy L. Yu et al., Spending on Prescription Drugs in the US: Where Does All the 
Money Go?, HEALTH AFF. (July 31, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog2 
0180726.670593/full/. 
 10  Allen Coukell & Ian Reynolds, A Look at Drug Spending in the U.S., PEW (Feb. 27, 
2018), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2018/02/a-look-at-
drug-spending-in-the-us (describing that in 2018, prescription drug spending was expected 
to rise more rapidly than any other part of the healthcare sector). 
 11  See Paulina Firozi, The Health 202: ‘Gag Clauses’ Mean You Might Be Paying More 
For Prescription Drugs Than You Need To, WASH. POST: POWERPOST (July 5, 2018), 
 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-health-202/2018/07/05/the-
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recent discussions regarding ways to lower costs for Americans, “gag 
clauses” captured national attention.12  Gag clauses are clauses found in 
contracts between Pharmacy Benefit Managers (“PBMs”) and 
pharmacies.13  These clauses are stipulations put in place by PBMs, which 
prohibit pharmacists from notifying consumers of the most cost-efficient 
way to procure their medication.14  Generally, this impedes a pharmacist 
from telling a consumer that paying out-of-pocket would be cheaper than 
processing the payment through the consumer’s insurance plan.15 
Until recently, gag clauses were relatively unknown outside of the 
industry.  Since making their debut in news headlines across the nation, 
they have captured widespread public attention and prompted lawmakers to 
take action at both the state and federal levels.16  Even President Donald 
Trump has commented, brandishing the practice “a total rip-off” and 
further indicating, “[W]e are ending it.”17  Since making that statement, the 
Trump Administration has achieved its goal of eliminating the use of gag 
clauses,18 but the elimination of gag clauses is only a surface level solution 
to a much deeper issue regarding the cost of drugs and the role of PBMs. 
This Comment will examine PBMs, their use of gag clauses, and the 
lessons that can be learned post-gag clause legislation.  Specifically, this 
Comment will address the various harms consumers face when gag clauses 
are permitted and utilized and further explain how these harms are not 
isolated incidents but issues pervasive in the PBM system.  Essentially, 
what has changed with the removal of gag clauses and what more can be 
done?  The analysis ultimately argues gag clauses were rightfully banned 
due to ethical implications and public policy concerns; however, rather than 
being viewed as an end, the prohibition of gag clauses should be considered 
the first step to amending problematic PBM practices.  Gag clauses 
 
health-202-gag-clauses-mean-you-might-be-paying-more-for-prescription-drugs-than-you-
need-to/5b3a36ca1b326b3348addc4a/?utm_term=.22255ed87d1e (describing a couple who 
could not afford a $111 co-pay for medication).  
 12  Id. 
 13  Id. 
 14  Robert Pear, Why Your Pharmacist Can’t Tell You That $20 Prescription Could Only 
Cost $8, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/24/us/politics/phar 
macy-benefit-managers-gag-clauses.html. 
 15  Id. 
 16  See id. 
 17  Katie Thomas, 6 Takeaways from Trump’s Plan to Lower Drug Prices, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/11/health/trump-drug-prices.html 
(statement from President Donald Trump commenting on the use of gag clauses during a 
speech addressing prescription drug prices). 
 18  Dartunorro Clark & Brenda Breslauer, Trump Signs Bill Lifting Pharmacist ‘Gag 
Clauses’ on Drug Prices, NBC NEWS (Oct. 10, 2018, 3:31 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/ 
politics/white-house/trump-signs-bills-lifting-pharmacist-gag-orders-drug-prices-n918721. 
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ultimately harmed consumers and offered little, if any, benefit.  
Unfortunately, this is a theme that persists despite the prohibition of gag 
clauses. 
Part II provides a brief overview of PBMs and describes the supply 
chain for how medication reaches a consumer, and more importantly, how 
price is determined.  Afterward, Part III defines gag clauses and their 
function.  Part IV then discusses some of the issues associated with gag 
clauses and details how they adversely impact consumers.  Part V explores 
the widespread attention received by gag clauses and analyzes state and 
federal legislation prohibiting their use. 
Finally, Part VI ends with the position that while gag clauses should 
be prohibited and their removal is ultimately a win for lawmakers and 
Americans alike, nothing has significantly changed.  The gag clause story 
reveals deeply entrenched issues in the PBM system; gag clauses are gone, 
yet issues regarding fiduciary duties, conflicts of interest, and transparency 
still remain.  If lawmakers are genuinely interested in protecting 
Americans, they should seek to strengthen gag clause legislation and find 
other avenues to further reform the harmful practices of PBMs. 
II. BACKGROUND: PBMS, DRUG PRICING, AND THE RISING COST OF 
HEALTHCARE 
For a drug to reach a consumer, there are several moving parts that 
must align.  Ideally, a patient goes to his or her doctor, the doctor makes a 
diagnosis, the doctor prescribes an appropriate medication, the patient goes 
to the pharmacy to have the prescription filled, and the patient receives the 
medication.  In reality, however, the system may not be so streamline.  
Patients must consider whether their insurer covers the prescription, 
whether the pharmacy they frequent is in network, and so on.  The entire 
process may spark endless questions: “who decides what drugs are 
included on a formulary?”; “why does a patient need to try several 
treatments prior to receiving the medication the physician originally wanted 
to prescribe?”; “what is actually the difference between a biosimilar and a 
bioequivalent?”  While all of these are valid, the most important question 
for the purposes of this Comment is: “how much will it cost?” 
A.  What is a PBM? 
PBMs came into existence in the 1970s to serve as “fiscal 
intermediaries by adjudicating prescription drug claims by paper and then, 
in the 1980s, electronically.”19  Historically, the role of the PBM was to 
 
 19  Allison Dabbs Garrett & Robert Garis, Leveling the Playing Field in the Pharmacy 
Benefit Management Industry, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 33, 34 (2007). 
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process prescriptions.20  The process began when a patient dropped his or 
her prescription off at the pharmacy to be filled.21  The pharmacy would 
then contact the PBM to ensure the patient had coverage, whether the 
prescription was covered by the plan, the copay amount, and whether 
further authorization was required.22  Once the prescription was filled, the 
pharmacy would contact the PBM with the patient’s information, and the 
PBM would then approve or disapprove the transaction.23  After, the PBM 
would seek payment from the insurer and transfer the proper payment 
amount to the pharmacy.24 
Since its inception, the role of the PBM has changed greatly.  From its 
arguably “humble” beginnings of “simply processing prescription 
transactions,” PBMs are now tasked with “managing the pharmacy benefit 
for health plans.”25  Individual insurers seek to control costs yet they do not 
always have the necessary expertise to effectively negotiate. 26  As a result, 
insurers have turned to PBMs to handle drug purchasing.27  PBMs have 
significant buying power and “act like giant buying networks for drugs, 
representing consumers from multiple employers and insurers.”28  Thus, 
insurers usually opt to contract with a PBM rather than internally manage 
drug procurement.29  Unlike the insurer, PBMs have standing within the 
pharmaceutical industry and the power to negotiate.30 
PBMs are best known as the entity that negotiates rebates and 
discounts with pharmaceutical manufacturers.  It is argued that, through 
their efforts, “PBMs save consumers and third-parties that pay for 
 
 20  Id. 
 21  Id. 
 22  Id. 
 23  Id. 
 24  Id. 
 25  Garrett & Garis, supra note 19. 
 26  Ruth Barber Timm, The Intraenterprise Conspiracy Doctrine and the 
Pharmaceutical Benefit Management Industry: A Proposed Exception to the Copperweld 
Holding, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 309, 316 (1996). 
 27  Id. 
 28  John Arnold, Are Pharmacy Benefit Managers the Good Guys or Bad Guys of Drug 
Pricing?, STAT (Aug. 27. 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/08/27/pharmacy-benefit-
managers-good-or-bad/. 
 29  Id. 
 30 Cole Werble, Pharmacy Benefit Managers, HEALTH AFF. (Sept. 14, 2017), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20171409.000178/full/.  See also Robert 
Calandra, PBMS: New Power and Influence, MANAGED CARE (April 5, 2015), 
https://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/2015/4/pbms-new-power-and-influence (“The 
more members a PBM represents, the bigger its buying power.  The bigger its buying 
power, the larger its influence on the marketplace.  The larger its influence . . . well, you get 
the idea.”). 
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prescription drugs billions of dollars each year.”31  These savings are 
achieved through various means. For instance, a PBM may be in charge of 
crafting the formulary, which gives the PBM immense leverage in 
negotiations.32  The ability to craft the formulary is powerful and can affect 
patient care.33  A formulary is a list of preferred drugs a plan covers.34  Plan 
participants are incentivized to use medications included on the formulary 
because these medications are generally cheaper.35  This, in turn, increases 
consumer demand for particular products and results in significant sales for 
the respective drug manufacturers.36  As a result, drug manufacturers want 
their products on the formulary, and since they are competing with every 
other manufacturer, they are willing to offer discounts and rebates to appeal 
to the formulary drafter, i.e. the PBM.37  Ultimately, PBMs have immense 
influence over which drugs consumers have access to, the means in which 
consumers are able to procure them, and how much they will cost.38 
Additionally, PBMs are powerful because they are largely under-
regulated and are able to partake in conduct that can impair, rather than 
enhance, the value of competition in the retail drug market.39  PBMs have 
amassed large patient networks, and in order for a manufacturer or 
 
 31  Joana Shepherd, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse: The Regulation of Pharmacy 
Benefit Managers by a Market Advisory, 9 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 2 (2013). 
 32  Garrett & Garis, supra note 19.  Being able to craft a formulary gives a PBM crucial 
leverage over the system because a PBM has the ability to “exclude hundreds of drugs” and 
show preference for a select few.  David Dayen, The Hidden Monopolies That Raise Drug 
Prices, AM. PROSPECT LONGFORM (Mar. 18, 2017), http://prospect.org/article/hidden-
monopolies-raise-drug-prices. 
 33  See Mark A. Buckles, Electronic Formulary Management and Medicaid: 
Maximizing Economic Efficiency and Quality of Care in the Age of Electronic Prescribing, 
11 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 179, 183 (2000) (“Plans encourage physicians . . . to adhere to 
formularies by linking their compensation or status in the plan to their prescribing practices 
or simply by making it more costly for patients if physicians deviate from the formulary.”). 
 34  Shepherd, supra note 31, at 5; Michael Bihari, Understanding Your Health Plan 
Drug Formulary, VERYWELL HEALTH (June 24, 2019) (“A drug formulary is a list of 
prescription drugs, both generic and brand name, that are preferred by your health plan” 
with the intention of steering patients towards “the least costly medications that are 
sufficiently effective for treating [the] health condition.”). 
 35  Shepherd, supra note 31, at 5. 
 36  Id. 
 37  Id. 
 38  Id. at 2 (“They [PBMs] influence how much consumers pay for drugs, which 
pharmacies they use, and even which drugs they take.”); Jane Horvath, Pharmacy Benefit 
Manager Model Legislation: Questions and Answers, NASHP (Aug. 9, 2018), 
https://nashp.org/pharmacy-benefit-manager-model-legislation-questions-and-answers/ (“If 
a manufacturer’s drug is not in a formulary, insurers won’t cover the drug and physicians 
won’t prescribe it, so PBMs have great leverage when negotiating prices.”). 
 39  See generally Garrett & Garis, supra note 19, at 34–35 (“Over the past decade, 
significant changes have occurred in the PBM industry, but regulation of the PBMs has not 
kept pace with those changes.”). 
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pharmacy to have access to that network, it must contract with the PBM.40  
Alternatively, to remain attractive to manufacturers and effectively 
negotiate, PBMs are motivated to grow their networks.41  As a result, 
PBMs have resorted to consolidation.42  The three largest PBMs, 
sometimes referred to as the “Big Three,” are Express Scripts, CVS 
Caremark, and OptumRx.43  It is estimated that these three PBMs control 
roughly seventy-five to eighty percent of market share, which translates to 
180 million prescription drug customers.44  With the exception of Express 
Scripts being a standalone PBM, CVS Caremark is aligned with the major 
drug retailer CVS Health, and OptumRX partners with the insurer 
UnitedHealth.45  All, however, have been parties in mergers and retain 
significant control of the PBM market.46 
While PBMs should help consumers, it is unclear whether they truly 
achieve this goal.  Given their role as masters of the formulary and the 
sheer volume of individuals managed, PBMs significantly impact 
consumers.  Primarily, this impact is realized through rebates and 
discounts.47  This model, utilizing rebates and discounts to raise revenue, 
has led to concerns regarding possible “perverse impact[s] on pharmacy 
costs and patient out-of-pocket costs.”48  Ultimately, when it comes to 
consumers, PBMs may actually be doing more harm than good. 
B.  Following the Cost (and the Pill) to the Consumer 
For a consumer who obtains a prescription drug at the pharmacy (as 
opposed to receiving it directly from a physician in an outpatient setting),49 
 
 40  Dayen, supra note 32. 
 41  Werble, supra note 30, at 2. 
 42  Id. 
 43  Garrett & Garis, supra note 19, at 36. 
 44  Garrett & Garis, supra note 19, at 34.  Another way to look at this: “Within the 
United States, approximately two-thirds of all prescriptions filled pass through the hands of 
PBMs in one way or another.”  Id. 
 45  Werble, supra note 30, at 2. 
 46  Evan Sweeney, Lawmakers Ask FTC for Retrospective Review of PBM Mergers, 
FIERCEHEALTHCARE (Jul. 30, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/payer/ho 
use-energy-and-commerce-ftc-pbm-mergers-healthcare-costs (“CVS Health bought 
Caremark in 2007, Express Scripts bought Medco Health Solutions in 2012 and 
UnitedHealth bought Catamaran in 2015.”).  Further, CVS is looking to acquire Aetna, and 
Cigna is looking to acquire Express Scripts.  Id. 
 47  See discussion infra Section II.B. 
 48  Horvath, supra note 38. 
 49  Drugs can be obtained at a pharmacy but can also be obtained directly from a health 
care provider.  See A Tangled Web: An Examination of the Drug Supply and Payment 
Chains (June 2018) [hereinafter A Tangled Web], https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/medi 
a/doc/A%20Tangled%20Web.pdf.  For example, a patient may receive care from the 
outpatient department of a hospital, a physician’s office, or an outpatient clinic and receive 
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that drug has traveled from the manufacturer that made the drug, all the 
way to the pharmacy that has the ability to dispense the drug.50  Yet 
following the movement of a pill from the manufacturer to the consumer is 
much less complex than following the exchange of money necessary to 
move the drug through the supply chain. 
The decision as to what a consumer will pay at the pharmacy counter 
depends on a complicated chain of negotiations largely influenced by the 
passing along of discounts and rebates.51  A manufacturer establishes a list 
price, also known as the Wholesale Acquisition Cost (“WAC”), which “is 
intended to capture the price a manufacturer would charge a drug 
wholesaler or other direct purchaser before any discounts, rebates or other 
price reductions.”52  This is the “sticker price.”53  The sticker price, 
however, is virtually never paid due to various financial incentives offered 
by manufacturers in an effort to stimulate demand.54  The manufacturer 
sells to a wholesale distributor, who pays a negotiated price, and in turn, 
the wholesale distributor will sell to a pharmacy, who pays a different 
negotiated price.55  It is during these separate negotiations that discounts 
and rebates come into consideration.56 
PBMs are the intermediary between the manufacturer and 
pharmacy—they negotiate price and conduct quality and utilization 
management screens on the drugs being purchased.57  The price is then 
passed to the consumer who may use his or her insurance, whether it be 
public or private coverage, to help pay for the drug.58  Every insurance plan 
 
medication directly from the health care provider without ever stepping foot inside a 
pharmacy.  Id. at vii.  In this situation, the drug is made by the manufacturer, sent to a 
wholesale distributor, and then makes it way to the health care provider.  Id.  This practice is 
sometimes referred to as “direct dispensing,” “point-of-care dispensing,” or “in-office 
dispensing.”  This Comment will not explore the administering of pharmaceuticals through 
the outpatient channel. 
 50  Follow the Pill: Understanding the U.S. Commercial Pharmaceutical Supply Chain, 
HEALTH STRATEGIES CONSULTANCY LLC 1 (Mar. 2005), https://avalere.com/research/docs/F 
ollow_the_Pill.pdf. 
 51  Henry C. Eickelberg, The Prescription Drug Supply Chain “Black Box” How It 
Works and Why You Should Care, AM. HEALTH POL’Y INST. 9 (2015), 
http://www.americanhealthpolicy.org/Content/documents/resources/December%202015_A
HPI%20Study_Understanding_the_Pharma_Black_Box.pdf. 
 52  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 53  Id. 
 54  Id.  This can be likened to buying a car.  A sticker price exists, but more often than 
not, that price will not be paid by the consumer. 
 55  Id. 
 56  Id. 
 57  Eickelberg, supra note 51, at 7. 
 58  See Laura D. Hermer, Private Health Insurance in the United States: A Proposal for 
a More Functional System, 6 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2005) (describing various 
means of accessing health care). 
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is unique, but generally, the insurance company and/or PBM will have 
contracts in place to reduce the cost of drugs for plan participants.59  This 
is, of course, assuming that the health coverage includes pharmacy 
coverage.60  If a consumer does not have pharmacy coverage, he or she will 
be charged a cash price.61 
As the middlemen, PBMs directly influence a consumer’s out-of-
pocket costs. Cost is contingent on how “well” the PBM is able to negotiate 
a rebate or discount, but more importantly, cost is ultimately decided by the 
price the PBM chooses to charge the consumer.62  For instance, a 
manufacturer may charge $10 for a pill that costs 50¢ to produce.  The 
PBM negotiates and pays $3, and to make a profit, the PBM will set the 
price at $5.  The consumer and their insurer will then pay the $5, and the 
PBM makes a profit of $2.  While $2 may seem inconsequential, it adds up 
in the aggregate.  Moreover, the split in price is not always just $5.  It can 
be a much larger and sometimes even shocking amount.  Take for example, 
the 2016 situation with Mylan’s EpiPen.  A two-pack EpiPen costs about 
$2 to manufacture.63  In 2007, Mylan was charging $100, and by 2016, the 
price exceeded $600 without any substantive justification for the price 
hike.64  The high price resulted in significant out-of-pocket costs for 
families, many of which could not afford the life-saving medication.65  On 
a $600 EpiPen, a PBM was estimated to receive roughly $300 per 
prescription.66  PBMs faced backlash for their failure to keep costs down, 
 
 59  Kimberly Amadeo, How Health Insurance Works, BALANCE (Sept. 25, 2018), 
https://www.thebalance.com/how-does-health-insurance-work-3306069 (“Health insurance 
is necessary for Americans to pay for the high cost of healthcare. . . . Health insurance 
companies provide lots of choices.”).  
 60  See Steve Vernon, Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage: You May Need a New 
Plan, CBS NEWS (Sept. 26, 2018; 1:23 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/medicare-
prescription-drug-coverage-open-enrollment-starts-oct-1-how-a-new-plan-can-save-money/ 
(explaining Medicare coverage may not include prescription drug coverage, which would 
“potentially save hundreds or even thousands of dollars.”).  The same is true for private 
insurance, and an individual’s private insurer may or may not include prescription drug 
coverage.  For example, Blue Cross Blue Shield directs participants to check their individual 
plan for coverage information.  How Do I Know My Plan Covers My Prescription Drug?, 
BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD NETWORK MICH., https://www.bcbsm.com/index/health-
insurance-help/faqs/plan-types/pharmacy/know-if-plan-covers-prescription-drug.html (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2018).  
 61  Eickelberg, supra note 51, at 10. 
 62  See Jessica Wapner, How Prescription Drugs Get Their Prices, Explained, 
NEWSWEEK (Mar. 17, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/prescription-drug-prici 
ng-569444. 
 63  Michelle M. Mello, What Makes Ensuring Access to Affordable Prescription Drugs 
the Hardest Problem in Health Policy?, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2273, 2274 (2018). 
 64  Id. 
 65  Id. at 2274–75.  EpiPens treat anaphylaxis.  Id. at 2273 n.2. 
 66  David Balto, How PBMs Make the Drug Price Problem Worse, HILL (Aug. 31, 2016, 
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especially when it seemed they pursued profit at the expense of 
consumers—consumers they were supposed to be serving and negotiating 
on behalf of.67  Undeniably, something went wrong in the EpiPen situation, 
and consumers paid the price.68 
Consumers arguably have the most at stake; they use the medication, 
yet the system does not offer them a voice nor does it allow them an 
opportunity to make decisions about care—instead, consumers “wait to see 
what their physicians prescribe and what their insurance will pay for.”69  
Because PBMs make their profit depending on the difference in cost 
between what they pay and what they charge, PBMs are incentivized to 
pass on higher costs to consumers.70  While the PBM may be saving the 
consumer from paying the list price—the price that nobody ever pays—the 
PBM may not be passing on the negotiated savings to consumers in a 
meaningful way. 
III. DEFINING THE “GAG CLAUSE” 
Gag clauses are found in contracts between PBMs and pharmacies and 
constrain a pharmacist’s ability to communicate price alternatives to a 
consumer.71  Pharmacies contract with PBMs in order to access the patients 
within the PBM’s network.72  In order to make a profit, a pharmacy needs 
to have customers, and in order to have customers, the pharmacy must 
engage with a PBM who is the gatekeeper to a plan’s participants.  When a 
pharmacy dispenses medication to a consumer, the pharmacy is at a 




 67  Id. 
 68  The EpiPen situation is still playing out, and the PBMs who were involved in the 
scandal are currently involved in litigation regarding their involvement.  In re EpiPen 
(Epinephrine Injection, USP) Mktg., Sales Practices & Antitrust Litig., 336 F. Supp. 3d 
1256 (D. Kan. 2018); see also Carmen Castro-Pagan, CVS, UnitedHealth, Others Must 
Defend EpiPen Pricing Suit, BLOOMBERG LAW (Oct. 29, 2018, 8:53 AM), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/employee-benefits/cvs-unitedhealth-others-must-defend-
epipen-pricing-suit (“The insureds who last year sued the nation’s largest pharmacy benefit 
managers—including Caremark, Express Scripts, Optum, and Prime Therapeutics LLC—
over EpiPen’s pricing scheme have alleged sufficient facts to establish their right to bring 
the lawsuit . . . .”).  
 69  Wapner, supra note 62. 
 70  Balto, supra note 66 (“The higher the price, the higher the rebate—and [the PBM] 
walk[s] away with a bigger slice of the pie.”). 
 71  Matthew Perrone, To Get Around Pharmacy Gag Rules, Ask About Drug Costs, 
MED. XPRESS (June 6, 2018), https://medicalxpress.com/news/2018-06-pharmacy-gag-
drug.html. 
 72  See supra text accompanying note 40. 
 73  See Follow the Dollar: Understanding How the Pharmaceutical Distribution and 
Payment System Shapes the Prices of Brand Medicines, PHRMA 1, 4 (Nov. 2017), 
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rely on PBMs to access consumers and receive payment.74  As part of the 
agreement allowing a pharmacy to work with the PBM’s patients, a 
pharmacy is likely to agree to various conditions such as a gag clause, 
which “contractually obligate[s a pharmacist] to keep quiet regarding 
possible patient cost savings” or risk losing the network contract with the 
PBM.75 
Often, gag clauses prevent pharmacists from notifying consumers they 
“could save money by paying cash for prescription drugs rather than using 
their health insurance.”76  This situation plays out in the following 
hypothetical: Jane Doe needs a prescription medication.  It costs the 
pharmacy $10 to stock the medication, and Jane’s copay is $20.  If Jane 
opts not to process the payment through her insurance, she would pay $10 
and have an immediate savings of $10.  If the pharmacist is subject to a gag 
clause, he or she will be unable to notify Jane of the price difference.  As a 
result, Jane will have to pay the higher price of $20 unless Jane knows to 
ask whether a lower price is available.  One pharmacist describes this 
situation as: “[If] I see on my screen that if you pay the cash price it would 
actually be cheaper for you than if you were to pay with your insurance, I 
can’t tell you unless you specifically ask me about it.”77 
Sometimes gag clauses are expressly stated in the contract.78  More 
commonly, however, the clauses are obscured or hidden in “broad 
confidentiality rules” that employ “broad and nebulous confidentiality 
verbiage.”79  While the clauses generally bar pharmacists from initiating 
conversations about cheaper alternatives, a gag clause may not be a 
complete prohibition on the information depending on the specific 
contract.80  Thus, if a consumer asks his or her pharmacist directly for a 
drug’s cash price or asks if there is a cheaper alternative, the gag clause is 
unlikely to interfere with the pharmacist being able to answer.81  
Conversely, a pharmacist beholden to a gag clause will never be able to 
 
http://phrma-docs.phrma.org/files/dmfile/Follow-the-Dollar-Report.pdf. 
 74  See Jeffrey S. Baird, What to Know About Working with PBMs, PHARMACY TIMES 
(Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.pharmacytimes.com/news/what-to-know-about-working-with-
pbms (“[T]he PBM ‘possesses the pharmacy’s money.’”). 
 75  Lynn Shapiro Snyder et al., New Federal Laws Banning “Gag Clauses” in the 
Pharmacy, EPSTEIN BECKER GREEN (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.healthlawadvisor.com/201 
8/10/19/new-federal-laws-banning-gag-clauses-in-the-pharmacy/. 
 76  Pear, supra note 14. 
 77  Firozi, supra note 11 (Anthony Reznik, director of government affairs for the 
Independent Pharmacy Alliance, on gag clauses). 
 78  Id. 
 79  Id. (explaining it would be rare to see an over prohibition that said, “Though shall 
not tell the patient the true negotiated price”). 
 80  Perrone, supra note 71. 
 81  Id.  
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initiate a conversation about cost.82 
Even if consumers have the ability to initiate a conversation with their 
pharmacist about cost alternatives, many do not. 83  Most consumers do not 
think of the cost of medication as being “negotiable”—much less know 
about the clauses—and would never think to ask.84  “As a consumer you 
would have no idea how it works . . . . Even if you were aware of the issue, 
it would be hard to know when the person across the counter says, ‘This is 
$20.’  They would pay the $20, because what is the option?”85  And this 
makes sense.  It would be counterintuitive for consumers to assume there is 
a cheaper option when the role of insurance is to lower costs.86 
Gag clauses are particularly problematic for vulnerable communities 
like senior citizens who are more likely to take larger amounts of 
prescription medication due to age-related health factors.87  The clauses 
also affect individuals who have plans with higher cost-sharing 
responsibilities because a gag clause could result in the consumer’s copay 
being higher than the retail price of the drug.88  Nevertheless, gag clauses 
have the ability to affect anyone.  Anyone who goes to a pharmacy to 
procure medicine, whether it is once a day or once every ten years, could 
potentially be affected. 
 
 
 82  Id. 
 83  Jared S. Hopkins, Pharmacists May Soon Be Able to Tell You the Cheapest Way to 
Get Prescriptions, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 25, 2018, 6:20 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-25/pharmacy-gag-clause-on-cheaper-
drug-prices-barred-by-congress (“Most patients never realize there’s a cheaper cash price 
because of clauses in contracts between pharmacies and PBMs that bar the drugstore from 
telling people there’s a cheaper way to pay.”). 
 84  Id. 
 85  Povich, supra note 1 (Richard Cauchi, the health program director for the National 
Conference of State Legislatures, on gag clauses). 
 86  Hopkins, supra note 83 (“Insurance is intended to save consumers money . . . .  Who 
would think that using your debit card to buy your prescription drugs would be less 
expensive than using your insurance card?  It’s counterintuitive.”); Sen. Susan Collins 
(@SenatorCollins), TWITTER (Oct. 10, 2018, 4:37 PM), 
 https://twitter.com/senatorcollins/status/1050123175688847362?lang=en. 
 87  See Susan Morse, House Passes Bills Prohibiting Pharmacy Gag Clauses on Drug 
Price, HEALTHCARE FIN. (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/ho 
use-passes-bills-prohibiting-pharmacy-gag-clauses-drug-prices (“Nearly 60 percent of 
Americans, including roughly 90 percent of seniors, take prescription 
drugs.  A study published in the Journal of the American Medical Association found that 23 
percent of prescriptions filled through insurance ended up costing more for customers than 
if they had paid out-of-pocket.”) 
 88  Mary Kane, New Laws Lift ‘Gag Clauses’ on Pharmacists, KIPLINGER (Oct. 10, 
2018), https://www.kiplinger.com/article/insurance/T039-C000-S009-new-laws-lift-gag-
clauses-on-pharmacists.html (“[I]f you pay a hefty co-pay, it might cost less to pay for a 
drug yourself . . . .”). 
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Without doubt, gag clauses are implemented to benefit PBMs, and 
PBMs offer several justifications for their utilization.  First, PBMs argue 
the money collected is reallocated to help keep costs down as well as slow 
premium increases.89  Second, PBMs argue they have the right to pocket 
excess payments because generally, consumers pay less due to the efforts 
of the PBM.90  In other words, PBMs “make less than they are requesting 
so it’s justified on the rarer occasions that they make more than the list 
price.”91  Third, PBMs argue there is a need to ensure consumers stay 
within the system.  If consumers are free to choose when they will and will 
not use their insurance, PBMs are unable to predict expenses, and they 
become susceptible to only paying for high-cost medications without an 
opportunity to recoup funds on lower cost prescriptions.92  Arguably, the 
lack of certainty would lead to higher costs for everyone in order to buffer 
the risk. 
There is also disagreement regarding how widespread gag clauses 
actually are and whether or not they truly impact consumers.  On the 
subject, a spokesman for Express Scripts indicated, “We do not engage in 
this anti-consumer practice and are working constructively with state and 
federal policymakers to ban this practice.”93  Likewise, a statement from 
CVS Health noted, “CVS Health’s own pharmacy benefit manager, CVS 
Caremark, does not engage in the practice of preventing pharmacists from 
informing patients of the cash price of a prescription drug, known as ‘gag 
clauses.’”94  Conversely, there are countless accounts from pharmacists 
 
 89  See Sean Dickson & Alisa Chester, Policymakers Seek Ways to Lower Drug Costs at 
the Pharmacy Counter, PEW (July 12, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/articles/2018/07/12/policymakers-seek-ways-to-lower-drug-costs-at-the-pharmacy-
counter.  
 90  Letters to the Editor, How Those Pharmacy Gag Clauses Are Justified, NJ.COM (Oct. 
19, 2018), https://www.nj.com/hudson/2018/10/how_those_pharmacy_gag_clauses_are_jus 
tified_lette.html. 
 91  Id. 
 92  This could be compared to the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate.  The 
individual mandate was implemented to compel Americans to purchase insurance in order to 
spread cost and prevent adverse selection.  Alberto R. Gonzales & Donald B. Stuart, Two 
Years Later and Counting: The Implications of the Supreme Court’s Taxing Power Decision 
on the Goals of the Affordable Care Act, 17 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 219, 222 (2014); 
see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 548 (2012).  The same could 
be said in this situation.  PBMs want to ensure that individuals continue to process payments 
through the insurer so costs can remain lower for everyone overall. 
 93  Firozi, supra note 11 (Phil J. Blando, spokesman for Express Scripts, in a statement 
to Health 202). 
 94  Id. (CVS Health in a March 2018 Statement on its website); CVS Caremark Does 
Not Have “Gag” Clauses, CVSHEALTH, https://cvshealth.com/thought-leadership/cvs-
caremark-facts/cvs-caremark-does-not-have-gag-clauses (“[A]t CVS Caremark, we do not 
and have never prevented pharmacies in our network from discussing the availability of a 
lower cash price with plan members.”  (emphasis omitted)) (last visited Jan. 7, 2020).   
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who indicate gag clauses are an everyday impediment to the work that they 
do.95  In 2016, an industry survey found “nearly 20 percent of pharmacists 
were limited by gag clauses more than 50 times per month.”96  In 2013, it 
was estimated that there were roughly $135 million in overpayments due to 
gag clauses.97  Regardless of which side of the debate is “correct,” gag 
clauses have been prevalent enough to warrant widespread attention and 
were framed by lawmakers as being a significant problem. 
IV. THE PROBLEM WITH GAG CLAUSES 
Those who have never heard of gag clauses usually react with 
discomfort or disgust.  When a system is supposed to help by lowering out-
of-pocket costs for consumers, it is unnerving to find that the exact 
opposite is occurring.98  Ultimately, gag clauses affect the way in which 
consumers are able to interact with pharmacists, thereby interfering with a 
relationship that otherwise functions on trust.99  As a consequence, not only 
do gag clauses raise concerns about saving money, they also highlight 
ethical and public policy implications. 
A.  Fiduciary Duties 
Gag clauses reveal an issue with fiduciary duties, specifically in 
regard to who owes them and who does not.  The fiduciary duties imposed 
on pharmacists do not directly require any sort of disclosure related to 
 
 95  I spoke with several pharmacists.  All of them were very aware of gag clauses and 
could cite to instances in which a gag clause had affected the way they interacted with a 
consumer.  Overwhelmingly, it seemed that gag clauses had a negative impact on consumer 
interactions. 
 96  Collins, McCaskill, Stabenow, Barrasso, Cassidy Bill to Prohibit “Gag Clauses” 
That Cause Consumers to Overpay for Prescriptions Clears Key Senate Hurdle, SUSAN 
COLLINS: U.S. SENATOR ME. (July 25, 2018, 10:52 AM), https://www.collins.senate.gov/ne 
wsroom/collins-mccaskill-stabenow-barrasso-cassidy-bill-prohibit-%E2%80%9Cgag-
clauses%E2%80%9D-cause-consumers. 
 97  Id.  Overpayments are the result of copays being more than the total cost of the 
medication, which means insurance does not need to contribute any payment.  Karen Van 
Nuys et al., Overpaying for Prescription Drugs: The Copay Clawback Phenomenon, USC 
SCHAFFER 1, 1 (2018).  These overpayments are pocketed by PBMs and are referred to as 
“clawbacks.”  Id.  Clawbacks are a separate but generally interrelated issue to gag clauses. 
 98  Brittany Hoffman-Eubanks, The Role of Pharmacy Benefit Managers in American 
Health Care: Pharmacy Concerns and Perspectives: Part 1, PHARMACY TIMES (Nov. 14, 
2017),  https://www.pharmacytimes.com/news/the-role-of-pharmacy-benefit-mangers-in-
american-health-care-pharmacy-concerns-and-perspectives-part-1 (“To address these 
increases in costs related to prescription drugs, private employer groups, individual States, 
and the federal government[ ] have utilized the services of pharmacy benefit managers.”). 
 99  Ryan Marotta, Pharmacists Remain Among Most Trusted and Ethical Professionals, 
PHARMACY TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.pharmacytimes.com/news/pharmacists-
remain-among-most-trusted-and-ethical-professionals (citing a Gallup poll, which listed 
pharmacists as ranked amongst the most honest and ethical professionals).  
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methods of prescription payment; however, pharmacists do have other 
fiduciary duties.  During their training, pharmacists are taught ethics, and 
there is a certain ethical norm expected of pharmacists by society as health 
care professionals.100  As such, the limitation placed on pharmacists via gag 
clauses is counterproductive to their role as fiduciaries.  “A fiduciary has 
‘duties involving good faith, trust, special confidence, and candor towards 
another,’” and the specific duties are defined by the specific relationship 
between the parties.101  Arguably, the most well-known fiduciary obligation 
in the medical profession is the Hippocratic Oath.102  Pharmacists are 
administered a similar oath called the “Oath of a Pharmacist,” which is 
curated by the American Pharmacists Association.103  Much like the 
Hippocratic Oath, the Oath of a Pharmacist describes a pharmacist’s duty 
to help patients and hold high standards.104 
The problem with gag clauses is that they interfere with a 
pharmacists’ ability to help the consumer.  The consumer is harmed 
tangibly in that he or she is unable to save money but also intangibly in that 
the relationship between the pharmacist and the consumer is strained.105  
 
 100  Courts have also found that pharmacists have fiduciary duties imposed by law.  The 
Supreme Court of New York found that pharmacists are “responsible for collecting 
otherwise confidential medical information and providing advice to customers.”  
Anonymous v. CVS Corp., 728 N.Y.S.2d 333, 337 (Sup. Ct. 2001).  The Court ultimately 
outlined a duty of confidentiality, which was implicated when the defendant in this case 
transferred customer information without the customer’s knowledge or consent.  Id.  
Alternatively, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed that pharmacists have a duty to 
counsel, which may extend to a duty to warn in instances of changes in dosage.  Jesse C. 
Vivian, Duty to Warn With No Directions for Use, U.S. PHARMACIST (Feb. 17, 2012), 
https://www.uspharmacist.com/article/duty-to-warn-with-no-directions-for-use; see also 
Nail v. Publix Super Mkts., 72 So. 3d 608, 614, 616 (Ala. 2011). 
 101  Julia A. Martin & Lisa K. Bjerknes, The Legal and Ethical Implications of Gag 
Clauses in Physician Contracts, 22 AM. J. L. & MED. 433, 456 (1996). 
 102  See Greek Medicine: The Hippocratic Oath, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MED., 
https://www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/greek/greek_oath.html.  The Hippocratic Oath establishes a 
physician duty as a healer obligated to help the patient first and foremost while also 
maintain the interests of society and self.  See also Rachel Hajar, The Physician’s Oath: 
Historical Perspectives, 18 HEART VIEWS 154, 156 (2017). 
 103  Oath of a Pharmacist, AM. PHARMACISTS ASS’N, https://www.pharmacist.com/oath-
pharmacist (last accessed Jan. 7, 2020). 
 104  Id. 
 105  One pharmacist explained to me how he would decide to go against the gag clause.  
Depending on whether the individual was a long-term customer and could be trusted not to 
contact his or her insurer to ask why their price was “higher,” which would ultimately get 
the pharmacist in trouble due to the gag clause, the pharmacist would be willing to disclose 
the price difference.  According to the pharmacist, he did not have any “official” fiduciary 
obligation to the individual—in fact, the duty was contractually owed to the PBM—but he 
felt it was worthwhile to act based on the trust relationship and the best interest of the 
consumer.  For those he opted against helping, it was merely business and nothing personal.  
He also indicated the fiduciary duty that should be owed is the one from the PBM to the 
consumer. 
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This relationship is important because there is a potentially large societal 
cost if citizens are unable to trust individuals who provide care.106  
“Patients are more likely to open up and disclose information if they trust 
their pharmacist[,]” and a better quality interaction leads to better care.107  
Gag clauses implicate a pharmacist’s fiduciary obligations, but they also 
present another dilemma: PBMs are tasked with lowering costs for 
consumers yet gag clauses achieve the exact opposite.  The logical follow-
up question: how does this happen when PBMs have a fiduciary obligation 
to protect consumers?  As the gag clause situation reveals, PBMs owe very 
few duties to consumers, which ultimately harms the consumer.108 
B.  Conflicts of Interest 
Gag clauses also show how the PBM system is riddled with conflicts 
of interest.  A “[c]onflict of interest describes a situation in which a person 
is or appears to be at risk of acting in a biased way because of personal 
interests.”109  Gag clauses put pharmacists in a position where they must 
choose between appeasing a PBM and acting in self-interest or helping the 
consumer by letting him or her know about a cheaper option and 
jeopardizing the pharmacy’s contract with the PBM.  One main function of 
PBMs is to forward money from the health plan to the pharmacy.110  
Pharmacists, especially independent pharmacists, often rely on the money 
from PBMs—”participation in PBM networks is the lifeblood of 
independent pharmacy revenue.”111  As such, there is financial pressure 
pushing against a pharmacist’s willingness to counsel a consumer in the 
face of a gag clause.112  A consumer may automatically assume the 
pharmacist is working on his or her behalf, unaware that the pharmacist is 
really allegiant to the PBM and the preservation of self due to a gag clause.  
 
 106  See Maria Allison & Betty Chaar, How to Build and Maintain Trust with Patients, 
PHARMACEUTICAL J. (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.pharmaceutical-journal.com/pharmacy-
learning-centre/how-to-build-and-maintain-trust-with-
patients/20201862.article?firstPass=false.  
 107  Id. 
 108  See discussion infra Section VI.B.1. 
 109  Christopher C. Muth, Conflicts of Interest in Medicine, 317 JAMA 1812, 1812 
(2017). 
 110  Garrett & Garis, supra note 19, at 34. 
 111  Jonathan L. Swichar & Bradley A. Wasser, Pharmacy Fights Back Against PBM 
Termination Notice, DUANE MORRIS (Nov. 2017),  
https://www.duanemorris.com/articles/pharmacy_fights_back_against_pbm_termination_no
tice_1117.html. 
 112  An independent pharmacist shared with me how crippling it can be to upset a PBM.  
As a small pharmacy, much of the pharmacist’s income could be dependent on PBM 
payments so from a financial standpoint, there is no benefit to helping a consumer by going 
against a gag clause at the expense of severing ties with the PBM.  At the end of the day, the 
consumer does not keep the lights on—the PBM does. 
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Also, depending on the contract, PBMs may have the power to terminate 
without cause.113  In a situation where PBMs retain so much power, it is 
unlikely a pharmacist will be willing to put a relationship he or she heavily 
relies on at risk. 
The utilization of gag clauses by PBMs highlights a flaw in the 
system where financial incentives are misaligned with what is best for 
consumers.  Like any business, PBMs only profit when consumers use their 
services, and gag clauses were a way to ensure consumers would not stray. 
While gag clauses are gone, the system remains, and once again, 
consumers are harmed. 
C.  Transparency 
Finally, gag clauses display how opaque the PBM system is.  Gag 
clauses are often coupled with broad rules regarding anti-disparagement or 
confidentiality, which makes it impossible for the gagged party to give any 
indication a gag clause is in effect.114  For example, one pharmacist landed 
himself in trouble with a PBM because discussing alternative ways to 
purchase a prescription breached the contract for “disparaging the plan.”115  
Gag clauses themselves are a form of confidentiality clause, which 
prohibits any kind of conversation about pricing.116  Hence, the problem is 
circular—not only is a pharmacist unable to tell a consumer about a 
cheaper option due to a gag clause, but the pharmacist may also be unable 
to discuss the constraints he or she is under as it could be viewed as 
disparaging.117  This is problematic because consumers are unaware of the 
restrictions placed on the pharmacist and are otherwise under the 
impression a pharmacist is loyal to them and not an unknown third-party 
entity.  The public suffers because pharmacists are unable to discuss the 
agreements that bind them. 
 
 113   See Swichar & Wasser, supra note 111.  
 114  Shannon Firth, Proposed House Bill Seeks to End Drug Price ‘Gag Clause,’ 
MEDPAGE TODAY (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.medpagetoday.com/publichealthpolicy/heal 
thpolicy/74942. 
 115  Id. 
 116  Deanna Dewberry, NYS Exposed: Insured Patients Could be Paying Too Much for 
Prescriptions, WHEC (Mar. 9, 2018, 7:07 AM), https://www.whec.com/news/insured-
patients-could-be-paying-too-much-for-prescriptions/4818961/. 
 117  See Mary Caffrey & Allison Inserro, Senate Votes 98-2 to Ban Pharmacist Gag 
Clauses, AJMC (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.ajmc.com/newsroom/senate-votes-982-to-
ban-pharmacist-gag-clauses (“The PBM stated we were in violation of our contract for 
disparaging the plan when we discussed the cost of a drug off insurance.”); Local 
Pharmacist Hugh Chancy in the White House, Champions Patients, VALDOSTATODAY.COM 
(Oct. 16, 2018), http://valdostatoday.com/news-2/local/2018/10/local-pharmacist-hugh-
chancy-goes-to-white-house/ [hereinafter Local Pharmacist] (“[I]f we said anything to 
disparage the plan or patient [drug] pricing then we were in violation.”). 
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The method for negotiating contracts is also suspicious and little is 
known the process because PBMs have the upper hand.  Pharmacies, 
particularly independent pharmacies, generally do not have the means to 
compete with big business.118  Often, a neighborhood pharmacy will be 
independently managed by an individual, or small group, whose 
responsibilities range from administering medication to reconciling budget 
sheets and paying to keep the lights on at the end of the month.  In order to 
protect themselves, small pharmacies will participate in a Pharmacy 
Services Administration Organization (“PSAO”), which is a group of 
independent pharmacies that have banned together to leverage bargaining 
power.119  Even so, a PBM is better situated to refuse a contract than an 
independent pharmacy, especially when the PBM community is so small 
and there is not an abundance of choice.120  For instance, the power wielded 
by the Big Three is imposing—”[i]f you’re outed by just one network out 
of these three, you could lose your entire business, and those patients lose 
access to a pharmacy they may have frequented for decades.”121 
In general, the contracting process with PBMs lacks transparency, 
which disadvantages pharmacists who do not have access to information 
about the party they are negotiating with or resources that would make the 
dealings more level.122  One pharmacist describes the situation: “People 
think we [pharmacists] can negotiate the contracts,” but in reality, PBMs 
 
 118  See Give Independent Pharmacies Leverage Against Take-it Or-Leave-it PBM 
Contracts, NCPA: NAT’L COMMUNITY PHARMACISTS ASS’N, http://www.ncpanet.org/pdf/leg 
/one_pager_hr_1188.pdf, (last visited Sept. 10, 2018). 
 119  Id. 
 120  A possible rebuttal to these contracts being considered adhesion contracts is the fact 
that pharmacists are not forced into contracting with any particular PBM if at all, and the 
purchasing of a plan can be likened to caveat emptor or “buyer beware.”  Dean Celia, 
Negotiating and Contracting with Pharmacy Benefits Managers, MANAGED HEALTH CARE 
CONNECT: PHARMACY NEWS 1, 1 (May 24, 2018), https://www.managedhealthcareconnect.c 
om/article/negotiating-and-contracting-pharmacy-benefits-managers.  Still, individuals 
“with little to no bargaining power may limit ability to negotiate away from a PBM’s 
standard contract.”  Id.  One pharmacist explains the dilemma, “I will admit, we freely sign 
those contracts because without it people will not come to us without having us file their 
insurance.”  Dewberry, supra note 116. 
 121  Firozi, supra note 11. 
 122  Celia, supra note 120.  These contracts could be defined as adhesion contracts due to 
their “take-it or leave-it” nature.  See Bryan A. Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 
1999).  An adhesion contract is defined as “a standard-form contract prepared by one party, 
to be signed by the party in a weaker position . . . who has little choice about the terms.”  Id.  
Moreover, the lack of available information about PBM practices restricts a pharmacist’s 
ability to make judgments about the contract.  This could potentially invoke questions about 
unconscionability.  Paul Bennett Marrow, Contractual Unconscionability: Identifying and 
Understanding Its Potential Elements, N.Y. ST. B.J.18, 22 (2000) (describing 
unconscionability to include “unfair surprise,” which is “when the real meaning of its terms 
are intentionally obscured from one of the parties, thereby precluding the complainant from 
making a reasoned choice.”). 
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“give us a contract and we take it or leave it.”123  These “take-it-or-leave-it 
contracts” offer no opportunity to negotiate, and they employ punitive 
conditions, which allow PBMs to freely audit pharmacies.124  These audits 
are then used to extract money based on minor technicalities, which can be 
crippling to a small pharmacy.125 
PBMs are not required to share information about their contracting 
practices.126  But, the issue with transparency goes beyond contracting. The 
overall lack of transparency implicates concerns about other business 
practices.  For example, the lack of information leads to concerns about 
how rebates and discounts are structured.127  Ultimately, the secretive 
nature of PBMs allows them to implement business practices that are not 
always in the best interest of consumers.  Due to the lack of transparency, it 
is not always readily apparent harm has occurred. 
V.  THE PROHIBITION OF GAG CLAUSES AND OTHER INITIATIVES TO 
INCREASE TRANSPARENCY AND LOWER DRUG COSTS 
Gag clause legislation has gained significant attention in the past few 
years and was recently a focus at both the state and federal level.  States 
opted to take various approaches to gag clauses and have had varying 
success in passing such legislation.128  The federal government similarly 
decided to take action and was successful in passing legislation prohibiting 
the use of gag clauses.129  The motivation to pass these anti-gag clause laws 
derived from legislative concern that opaque cost-only practices harmed 
consumers without adding any public benefit. 
A.  Legislation at the State Level 
Gag clause legislation at the state level has been around for many 
years.130  Most of the traction regarding states opting to take action against 
 
 123  Local Pharmacist, supra note 117. 
 124  Dayen, supra note 32. 
 125  Id.  
 126  See Michael Carrier, A Six-Step Solution to the PBM Problem, HEALTH AFF. (Aug. 
30, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180823.383881/full/ (“PBM 
agreements are audited in secure rooms with few contracts reviewed, restricted notetaking, 
and only client-specific information . . . .”). 
 127  See Jane Horvath, New NASHP Model Legislation Helps States Bring Transparency 
to Pharmacy Benefits Managers, NASHP (Aug. 28, 2018), https://nashp.org/new-nashp-
model-legislation-helps-states-bring-transparency-to-pharmacy-benefit-managers/. 
 128  See infra text accompanying notes 131–144. 
 129  See infra text accompanying notes 148–163.   
 130  The Employer Retirement Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) “preempts any state law 
that may or does ‘relate to any employee benefit plan’ regulated by ERISA.”  Albert Feuer, 
When do State Laws Determine ERISA Plan Benefit Rights?, 47 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 145, 
162 (2014).  Since gag clause legislation at the state level may potentially impact ERISA, 
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gag clauses, however, was gained around 2016 and came to a head in 
2018.131  Between 2016 and 2018, at least twenty-six states enacted laws 
from a grouping of roughly forty-one states, all of which considered 
legislation to prohibit gag clauses.132  This was a noteworthy trend because 
“[s]tates are sovereign entities; they don’t work in tandem.”133  Moreover, 
not only were the states working in parallel, but gag clause efforts were not 
contained to the acts of one political party and instead transcended party 
lines.134  Ultimately, collective sentiment at the state level overwhelmingly 
pointed to banning gag clauses. 
Lawmakers were clear, they disliked gag clauses because they harmed 
constituents.  Senator Martin Looney, on the issue of gag clauses, stated, 
“This is information consumers should have . . . but they were denied under 
somewhat arbitrary and capricious contracts that pharmacists were required 
to abide by.”135  Accordingly, the goal for lawmakers when passing gag 
clause legislation was to advocate against the practice as their use was 
collectively viewed as unfair and deceptive. 
There has not been any one specific way to address the issue.  In 
tackling gag clauses, states have addressed the problem in a variety of 
different ways, whether they choose an outright ban on the practice, 
increased transparency, a requirement for additional documentation, or a 
mixture of several different aims.136  The most basic approach is an outright 
ban.  This is achieved by either explicitly stating gag clauses cannot be 
utilized in contracting or, alternatively, permitting pharmacists to inform 
consumers about the availability of a lower cost, regardless of whether a 
gag clause is contained in the contract.137  Several states have elected to go 
 
there is question whether ERISA’s gag clause preemption clause is triggered.  This 
Comment will not explore the impact ERISA had/has on state legislators as they drafted gag 
clause legislation.  
 131  Richard Cauchi, Prohibiting PBM “Gag Clauses” that Restrict Pharmacists from 
Disclosing Price Options: Recent State Legislation 2016-2018, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Dec. 1, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/Health/Pharmacist 
_Gag_clauses-2018-14523.pdf. 
 132  Id.; see also Jay Phillips, A 50 State Scan: States Move to Protect Healthcare 
Consumers by Prohibiting Gag Clauses on Pharmacists, COUNCIL ST. GOV’TS: JAY 
PHILLIP’S BLOG (July 3, 2018, 9:59 AM), http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/50-
state-scan-states-move-protect-healthcare-consumers-prohibiting-gag-clauses-pharmacists. 
 133  Povich, supra note 1 (Richard Cauchi, the health program director for the National 
Conference of State Legislatures, on the surge of states enacting gag clause legislation as a 
bipartisan initiative). 
 134  See, e.g., H.B. 1791, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2018) (enacted) (sponsored by 
Representative Butler (D), Representative Rosenwald (D), Representative Williams (D), 
Representative Forthergill (R), Representative Knirk (D)). 
 135  Pear, supra note 14. 
 136  See infra text accompanying notes 137–144. 
 137  See, e.g., S.B. 3104, 29th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2018) (failed); S.B. 576, 2018 Gen. 
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this route, and while some have been successful, other proposals have 
failed.138 
In contrast, other states have approached gag clauses by challenging 
the practice directly while simultaneously focusing on additional initiatives 
to curb gag clauses via additional PBM regulations.139  For example, 
California has prohibited a formulary from containing more than four 
tiers.140  The state has also made it a requirement that if there is a difference 
in price between a prescription’s retail price and the consumer’s applicable 
copay/coinsurance, the consumer will be charged the lesser amount.141  
Comparatively, Nevada law has prohibited PBMs from restricting a 
pharmacist’s ability to provide information regarding payment, drug 
efficiency, or the availability of a cheaper alternative, and the state further 
restricts PBMs from penalizing pharmacists who choose to provide the 
information to consumers.142  Nevada has also established transparency and 
recording requirements for prescription drug costs and pricing.143 
These are only two examples out of many, but they represent different 
approaches available to states aiming to take on gag clauses.  Ultimately, 
each state must choose the approach that best fits its constituency.  
Nevertheless, it appears that more states have had success at passing 
legislation when compared to those who have not.144  At the heart of it, 
states are driven by a desire to protect their citizens, and gag clauses do 
anything but. 
B.  Legislation at the Federal Level 
Like state governments, the federal government has been vocal in its 
opposition to gag clauses.  This has been a shared objective between the 
executive and legislative branches. In the House, Representative Earl 
“Buddy” Carter introduced the Know the Cost Act on September 13, 
 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2018) (enacted); H.B. 426, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2018) 
(failed). 
 138  See, e.g., S.B. 3104, 29th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2018) (failed); S.B. 576, 2018 Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2018) (enacted); H.B. 426, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2018) 
(failed). 
 139  See infra text accompanying notes 141–143. 
 140  S.B. 1021, 29th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (enacted). 
 141  Cauchi, supra note 131; see also S.B. 1021, 29th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) 
(enacted); Senator Weiner Introduces Dug Co-pay Bill to Permanently Protect Consumers 
from Price Gouging, SCOTT WEINER REPRESENTING CAL. SENATE DISTRICT 11, (Feb. 8, 
2018), https://sd11.senate.ca.gov/news/20180208-senator-wiener-introduces-drug-co-pay-
bill-permanently-protect-consumers-price-gouging.  
 142  Cauchi, supra note 131; see also S.B. 539, 29th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2017) 
(enacted). 
 143  Id. 
 144  See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 132. 
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2018.145  Representative Carter spoke about the impact gag clauses have 
had on his role as a pharmacist.146  He shared his frustration that practices, 
such as gag clauses, continually harm consumers and challenged the role of 
PBMs indicating, “They bring no value whatsoever.”147 
The Senate introduced two bills.  First, the Patient Right to Know 
Drug Prices Act, which Senator Collins introduced on March 14, 2018.148  
Senator Collins described the need to act stating, “Multiple reports have 
exposed how this egregious practice has harmed consumers, such as one 
customer who used his insurance to pay $129 for a drug when he could 
have paid $18 out of pocket.”149  The law is meant to “prohibit an insurer or 
pharmacy benefit manager from restricting a pharmacy’s ability to provide 
drug price information to a plan enrollee when there is a difference 
between the cost of the drug under the plan and the cost of the drug when 
purchased without insurance.”150  This bill focuses on plans offered through 
exchanges and by private employers.151 
On the same day, Senator Debbie Stanebow introduced a second bill, 
the Know the Lowest Price Act.152  This bill is virtually identical to Senator 
Collin’s bill with the exception that it refers to individuals receiving 
coverage under Medicare.153  Senator Stanebow’s motivation for 
introducing the bill was much like Senator Collin’s—protecting 
Americans.154  And like at the state level, both bills were a bipartisan effort 
 
 145  Know the Lowest Cost Act, H.R. 6733, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 146  Firozi, supra note 11. 
 147  Id.  President Trump acknowledged Representative Carter during the signing of the 
two bills regarding gag clauses that originated in the Senate.  Jessie Hellman, Trump Signs 
Bills Banning Drug Pricing ‘Gag Clauses,’ HILL (Oct. 10, 2018, 2:47 PM), 
https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/410813-trump-signs-bills-banning-drug-pricing-gag-
clauses. 
 148  Patient Right to Know Drug Prices Act, S. 2554, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 149  Senator Collins, McCaskill, Stabenow Lead Bipartisan Group of Senators in 
Introducing Legislation to Prohibit “Gag Clauses” That Cause Consumers to Pay Higher 
Prescription Drugs, SUSAN COLLINS: U.S. SENATOR ME., (Mar. 15, 2018, 1:10 PM), 
https://www.collins.senate.gov/newsroom/senators-collins-mccaskill-stabenow-lead-
bipartisan-group-senators-introducing-legislation (Senator Collins in a press release 
regarding gag clause legislation). 
 150  Id. 
 151  Id. 
 152  Know the Lowest Price Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-262, § 2553, 132 Stat. 3670 
(2018). 
 153  Id. 
 154  See Mary Caffrey & Allison Inserro, Senate Votes 98-2 to Ban Pharmacist Gag 
Clauses, AJMC (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.ajmc.com/newsroom/senate-votes-982-to-
ban-pharmacist-gag-clauses (“Patients should have the right to know if they can save money 
by paying cash out-of-pocket rather than using their insurance and their pharmacists should 
have the right to tell them.”). 
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and garnered widespread support in Congress.155 
Not only have legislators voiced their dislike for gag clauses, so has 
the President.  President Trump, and by extension, the Trump 
Administration, have been vocal about the issue.  On May 11, 2018, the 
Administration released “American Patients First: The Trump 
Administration Blueprint to Lower Prices and Reduce Out-of-Pocket 
Costs” (“American Patients First”),  which enumerated the prohibition of 
gag clauses as a priority.156  The President further voiced his support 
through Twitter: “Americans deserve to know the lowest drug price at their 
pharmacy, but ‘gag clauses’ prevent your pharmacist from telling you!  I 
support legislation that will remove gag clauses and urge the Senate to act.  
#AmericanPatientsFirst.”157  Similarly, the President’s Secretary of Health 
and Human Services, Alex Azar, has also expressed a personal 
commitment to outlawing gag clauses.158  He praised Senator Collins in her 
efforts to eliminate gag clauses and indicated he was committed to working 
with her in further achieving her objective.159 
On October 10, 2018, President Trump signed the two Senate bills, 
the Patient Right to Know Act and the Know the Lowest Price Act, into 
law.160  During the signing, the President indicated, “It’s way out of whack 
 
 155  See id. (describing how the Senate passed the Patient Right to Know Act 98-2 after 
the Know the Lowest Price Act had been passed the week prior); A Six-Step Solution to the 
PBM Problem, HEALTH AFF.: HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Aug. 30, 2018), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180823.383881/full/ (indicating that one 
bill was introduced by a Republican while the other was introduced by a Democrat). 
 156  American Patients First: The Trump Administration Blueprint to Lower Drug Prices 
and Reduce Out-of-Pocket Costs 1, 25 (May 2018), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ 
AmericanPatientsFirst.pdf [hereinafter American Patients First] (“Prohibit Part D plan 
contracts from preventing pharmacists from telling patients when they could pay less out-of-
pocket by not using their insurance—also known as pharmacy gag clauses.”); President 
Donald J. Trump’s Blueprint to Lower Drug Prices, (May 11, 2018) https://www.whitehous 
e.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-blueprint-lower-drug-prices/ 
(“Prohibit Part D contracts that include ‘gag rules’ that prevent pharmacists from informing 
patients when they could pay less out-of-pocket by not using insurance.”). 
 157  Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 17, 2018, 2:10 PM), 
 https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1041751173034848260?lang=en. 
 158  Alex M. Azar, Remarks on Value-Based Transformation to the Federation of 
American Hospitals, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERV. (March 5, 2018), https://www.hhs.g 
ov/about/leadership/secretary/speeches/2018-speeches/remarks-on-value-based-transformati 
on-to-the-federation-of-american-hospitals.html (sharing how he had personally been 
affected by the lack of transparency in healthcare pricing during an address to the American 
Federation of Hospitals). 
 159  Secretary Azar Pledges to Work With Senator Collins on Legislation to Prohibit Gag 
Clauses That Cause Consumers to Overpay Medications, SUSAN COLLINS: U.S. SENATOR 
ME. (June 16, 2018) https://www.collins.senate.gov/newsroom/secretary-azar-pledges-work-
senator-collins-legislation-prohibit-gag-clauses-cause. 
 160  Clark & Breslauer, supra note 18. 
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[drug pricing].  It’s way too high.”161  He then continued, “It’s a big win for 
patients . . . . It’s a big win for patients in terms of allowing pharmacists to 
openly discuss medication prices to save patients money and health care 
costs.”162  Secretary Azar further indicated there is “more to come” in 
reference to fixing transparency in pricing and high costs and that the 
Administration was ready to take on “anybody that [it] need[s] to take 
on.”163  Nonetheless, while gag clause legislation was a crucial first step, 
many of the issues revealed by gag clauses are still prevalent.  Thus, there 
is still much more that needs to be done to offer better protection to 
consumers. 
VI. LIFTING THE GAG—NOW WHAT? 
While there are many reasons why gag clause legislation came to 
fruition, the ultimate goal was to protect consumers better.  The legislation 
achieves this objective to a certain extent, but many problems still remain.  
The gag clause story reveals deeply rooted issues within the PBM system 
regarding fiduciary duties, conflicts of interest, and transparency—all of 
which steadfastly remain post-gag clause legislation.  With gag clauses a 
thing of the past, the discussion now turns on the future.  According to 
President Trump, “We’re very much eliminating the middlemen.  The 
middlemen became very, very rich, right?  Whoever those middlemen 
were—and a lot of people never even figured it out—they’re rich.  They 
won’t be so rich anymore.”164  The middlemen are PBMs.  It is unclear 
whether President Trump has true intentions of eliminating PBMs, and it is 
unlikely this would ever occur.165  Regardless, the focus should not solely 
be that PBMs have money but rather why and what it means for consumers. 
The existence of gag clauses arguably had, and would continue to 
have, no bearing on the high cost of drugs.166  Pricing is based on numerous 
factors such as the list price and the outcome of negotiations between 
 
 161  Id. 
 162  Id. 
 163  Brittany Shoot, Trump Signs 2 Drug Pricing Bills, HHS Secretary Promises ‘More to 
Come,’ FORTUNE (Oct. 11, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/10/11/trump-administration-gag-
clause-compare-prescription-prices/. 
 164  Nathaniel Weixel, Defending the ‘Middlemen’ in the Battle on Drug Prices, HILL 
(May 15, 2018, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/lobbyist-profiles/387669-
defending-the-middlemen. 
 165  Interestingly, there is discussion regarding whether there could be a system without 
PBMs.  See Sally Welborn & Pramod John, Imagine There Are No PBMs. It’s Easy if You 
Try, STAT (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/08/23/pbms-rebates-drug-
purchasing/. 
 166  Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the United States 
Origins and Prospects for Reform, 316 JAMA 858, 860 (2016) (“[T]he US health care 
system allows manufacturers to set their own price for a given product.”). 
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manufacturers and a wholesaler or PBM.167  With or without a gag clause, 
prices are “set extraordinarily high.”168  Ultimately, the root issue is not 
addressed since the “price” otherwise remains the same regardless of the 
savings realized—not only does consumer cost need to be lowered, so do 
drug prices.169  Namely, a $100 prescription remains $100 regardless of 
how much the consumer pays out-of-pocket (gag clause or otherwise).  
Likewise, the gag generally did not hinder the sharing of information, it 
just barred a pharmacist from initiating a conversation about price—a 
consumer was always free to ask if there were ways to save.  Therefore, the 
issue of cost runs much deeper than just the gag clause itself.  Rather, the 
PBM system has made it possible for situations like gag clauses to occur. 
While it is possible the elimination of gag clauses may have 
significant effects on individuals depending on their specific situation, it is 
unlikely the legislation will affect a large portion of the population in a 
meaningful way or protect against other predatory practices.  Banning gag 
clauses without doing more is like putting a bandage on a wound that 
requires stitches.  The effort to curb high drug costs and better protect 
consumers requires a much larger and longer conversation from the 
industry and lawmakers.  First, lawmakers should look to see how gag 
clause legislation could be fortified.  Second, lawmakers should look 
beyond gag clauses, consider how else consumers are harmed by PBMs, 
and seek to reform the structure that allowed gag clauses to be such a 
commonplace practice.  Lawmakers have the ability to amend the PBM 
system and ultimately protect consumers, but they need to take the 
initiative.170 
A.  Strengthening Gag Clause Legislation 
Gag clause legislation is integral to ensuring the practice ceases to 
exist, although further inspection shows there is room for legislators to take 
a stronger stance when it comes to protecting consumers.  The federal 
 
 167  Wapner, supra note 62. 
 168  Id. 
 169  See Robert King, House Panel Advances Bill to Counter ‘Gag Clauses’ that Lead to 
Higher Drug Prices, WASH. EXAMINER (Sept. 7, 2018, 10:31 AM), https://www.washington 
examiner.com/policy/healthcare/house-panel-advances-bill-to-counter-gag-clauses-that-
lead-to-higher-drug-prices. 
 170  The subsequent discussion largely reflects how states could directly legislate to 
counteract problematic PBM practices.  More specifically, however, have been approaches 
by certain states to regulate PBMs through the state’s insurance department.  See, e.g., S.B. 
1504, 129th Leg., 1 Reg. Sess. (Me. 2019); Sarah Lanford, Montana Explores a New 
Approach to Regulating Pharmacy Benefit Managers, NASHP (Feb. 26, 2019), 
https://nashp.org/montana-explores-a-new-approach-to-regulating-pharmacy-benefit-
managers/.  The use of a state’s insurance department’s regulatory authority is outside the 
scope of this Comment. 
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legislation only prohibits the use of gag clauses and offers no further 
protection.171  Just because a consumer is able to immediately save some 
money at the pharmacy counter by paying out-of-pocket with the 
elimination of gag clauses, does not mean the consumer will actually save 
money in the long run; the consumer still needs to be aware of how his or 
her insurance plan is structured due to other factors that affect out-of-
pocket costs.172 
A pharmacist no longer bound by a gag clause may opt to tell a 
consumer he or she may save by paying out-of-pocket and forgoing 
insurance.  To most, this sounds like an obvious choice—save the money 
and pay the cheaper price—however, there is more to consider.  For 
instance, some individuals need to pay a pharmacy deductible before the 
insurer begins to pay.173  The more often an individual chooses to pay out-
of-pocket, the less likely he or she will pay off the deductible since insurers 
have no obligation to count these payments towards the deductible.174  In 
other words, the deductible may take longer to pay off, and this means 
more dollars spent before insurance will apply.  Unless an individual is 
diligently tracking his or her savings every time the decision is made not to 
pay through the insurer, the individual may not actually be saving money.  
Put differently, saving a few dollars today does not necessarily translate to 
saving money in the future.  The gag clause legislation does not require 
out-of-pocket costs to be counted towards deductibles, which could result 
in today’s savings being tomorrow’s burden. Consumer protections would 
be much stronger if the law required that lower costs be counted towards 
deductibles.  California’s gag clause legislation, for example, contains this 
 
 171  See Know the Lowest Price Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-262, § 2553, 132 Stat. 
3670 (2018); Patient Right to Know Drug Prices Act, Pub. L. No. 115-263, § 2554, 132 
Stat. 3672 (2018).  
 172  See supra text accompanying notes 173–174. 
 173  Amadeo, supra note 59 (“The deductible.  That’s what you pay before the insurance 
company contributes a dime.”).  Pharmacy deductibles function the same way as a standard 
deductible and have grown in popularity amongst insurers.  See generally Emergence and 
Impact of Pharmacy Deductibles: Implications for Patients in Commercial Health Plans, 
IQVIA: IMS INST. HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS (Sept. 2015), https://www.iqvia.com/-
/media/iqvia/pdfs/institute-reports/emergence-and-impact-of-pharmacy-deductibles.pdf?la= 
en&hash=1D397351342823EDEFDECFC4F119CCBFD56E904F (discussing the 
emergence of pharmacy deductibles). 
 174  Dickson & Chester, supra note 89 (“[M]onies paid outside an insurance plan may 
not count toward the patient’s deductible or out-of-pocket spending limit.”); see also 
Elizabeth Davis, What Counts Toward Your Health Insurance Deductible?, VERYWELL 
HEALTH (Jan. 5, 2020), https://www.verywellhealth.com/what-counts-toward-your-health-
insurance-deductible-1738559 (“Money you pay out-of-pocket for health care services that 
aren’t a covered benefit of your health insurance won’t be credited toward your health 
insurance deductible.”).  
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requirement.175 
In addition, the gag clause legislation does not require pharmacists to 
initiate a conversation regarding lower drug prices.176  Instead, it is left to 
each pharmacist’s personal discretion whether he or she would like to say 
something.177  Since there are no protections to ensure consumers are 
actually told the lowest price, they may be left in the same situation as they 
were prior to the legislation being passed, i.e. still having to ask whether 
there is a lower priced alternative.  Moreover, the issue that many 
consumers are unlikely to think of medication as having a negotiable price 
still stands, which means they will not prompt the cost conversation 
themselves because “the act of asking the question [‘what is the cash 
price?’] requires a level of health care literacy which many patients do not 
possess.”178  Federal or uniform state legislation would be more effective if 
it required pharmacists to make disclosures about the price to consumers.179  
In California, “pharmacists are not just allowed to tell patients when lower 
prices are available, but are required to tell them about those cost 
savings.”180  As of now, California is an outlier, but if federal and/or state 
lawmakers were to adopt the California approach, consumers would be 
better protected. 
Even further, the law could prohibit a consumer from paying more 
than the cash price, if the cash price is the lowest price available.  This 
would ensure the consumer is paying the lowest possible price every single 
time he or she goes into the pharmacy.  No longer would the consumer or 
pharmacist have to initiate conversation; instead, the savings would be 
compulsory.  Once again, California put a safeguard like this in place to 
ensure its citizens are able to realize savings whenever possible.181  This 
sort of law, however, would be most effective when coupled with a law that 
 
 175  Lisa L. Gill, Trump Signs Bills Banning ‘Gag Clauses,’ Helping Consumers Save on 
Drugs, CONSUMER REP. (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.consumerreports.org/drug-prices/trum 
p-signs-bill-banning-gag-clauses-helping-consumers-save-on-drugs/. 
 176  See Know the Lowest Prices Act of 2018 § 2553; Patient Right to Know Drug Prices 
Act § 2554.  
 177  See Know the Lowest Prices Act of 2018 § 2553; Patient Right to Know Drug Prices 
Act § 2554. 
 178  Hayward K. Zwerling, Drug Costs at Pharmacies Lack Transparency, 
COMMONWEALTH (Oct. 19, 2018), https://commonwealthmagazine.org/opinion/drug-costs-
at-pharmacies-lack-transparency/. 
 179  Regulation of a profession in this manner would usually be a matter of state law.  See 
U.S. Const. amend. X; see also Ronald L. Scott, Cybermedicine and Virtual Pharmacies, 
103 W. VA. L. REV. 407, 476 (2001) (“[P]harmacists are licensed by the states for the 
practice of pharmacy within a state’s boarders, federal law also regulates aspects of the 
practice of pharmacy.”).  As such, regulation such as the one proposed would most likely 
come from the states rather than the federal government. 
 180  Gill, supra note 175. 
 181  Cauchi, supra note 131. 
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requires out-of-pocket payments be counted for insurance purposes.  
Otherwise, such a law could have a negative impact and achieve the exact 
opposite of what is intended.182 
B.  The Future of “Those Middlemen”: Other Legislative 
Considerations 
Gag clauses can be viewed as a small-scale representation of much 
larger issues.  Even though gag clauses are gone, many of the problems that 
legislators and challengers highlighted still remain relevant. Issues 
regarding fiduciary duties, conflicts of interest, and transparency are as 
prevalent as ever and continue to be problematic aspects of PBMs.  If 
legislators want to protect consumers, they must move beyond gag clauses 
and take stronger positions against questionable PBM practices, the very 
practices that allowed gag clauses to flourish. 
In May 2018, the Trump Administration issued American Patients 
First, a blueprint for lowering drug prices and reducing out-of-pocket 
costs.183  As part of the initiative to lower out-of-pocket costs, President 
Trump cited the elimination of gag clauses.184  The President’s plan then 
went on to list additional opportunities to make improvements regarding 
transparency and easier access to pricing although he failed to offer a 
comprehensive plan.185  In response, the minority staff of the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Finance issued the report, “A Tangled Web: An Examination 
of the Drug Supply and Payment Chain” (“A Tangled Web”).186  The report 
challenged American Patients First indicating the ideas it proposed were 
“simply not sufficient to reduce costs significantly for Americans[,]” and 
further, a “majority of the President’s plan posed questions rather than 
solutions.”187  The report is framed as a call to action, describing how 
complex and broken the system is; yet it does not extend solutions itself.188  
Moving forward, legislators on both sides should consider the following if 
they intend to better protect consumers. 
1.  Fiduciary Duties 
A recurring issue with PBM transactions is that it is unclear who owes 
whom what duties or, alternatively, if there are even duties owed to begin 
with.  As it currently stands, PBMs do not owe fiduciary duties to plan 
 
 182  See supra text accompanying notes 173–175. 
 183  American Patients First, supra note 156. 
 184  Id. at 37. 
 185  Id. at 11. 
 186  A Tangled Web, supra note 49, at ii. 
 187  A Tangled Web, supra note 49, at x. 
 188  A Tangled Web, supra note 49, at 45. 
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participants.189  While PBMs are tasked with negotiating benefits, they 
have no duty to ensure those benefits are actually beneficial.  American 
Patients First discusses the lack of fiduciary duties.190  The blueprint 
appears to contemplate the possibility of PBMs as fiduciaries by briefly 
mentioning “fiduciary dut[ies] for pharmacy benefit managers,” but it does 
not explain what this would entail.191  Presumably, the idea is that the PBM 
would have a fiduciary obligation to the plan, which would mean the PBM 
has a fiduciary obligation to the consumer.192  A PBM with a fiduciary 
obligation to the consumer would have to act in the consumer’s best 
interest.  This means the consumer’s interests would actually be 
represented by the PBM and be reflected in the PBM’s business practices.  
In the situation of gag clauses, PBMs had no obligation to act in the interest 
of plan participants.  As such, gag clauses were perfectly permissible. 
The solution to this issue does not have to be complex—legislators 
can impose fiduciary responsibilities on PBMs.  Essentially, PBMs would 
have an obligation to look out for the well-being of plan participants.  Such 
a law would prevent another gag clause situation from occurring because 
the PBM would have to act with the best interest of the consumer in mind.  
The PBM, at all times, would be required to meaningfully consider the 
impact of its actions on the consumer, whether it be during the negotiation 
of discount, while crafting the formulary, etc.  In 2003, Maine first 
addressed PBMs and fiduciary duties.193  The state passed the Unfair 
Prescription Drug Practices Act, which imposed fiduciary duties upon 
PBMs.194  The law stated, a PBM “owes a fiduciary duty to a covered entity 
and shall discharge that duty in accordance with the provisions of state and 
federal law.”195  It continued, “A pharmacy benefits manager shall perform 
its duties with care, skill, prudence and diligence and in accordance with 
 
 189  Generally, PBMs are not regarded to as fiduciaries.  There are also examples of 
courts finding that PBMs are not fiduciaries.  See, e.g., In re Express Scripts/Anthem 
ERISA Litig., 285 F. Supp. 3d 655, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding a PBM was not a 
fiduciary); In re Express Scripts, Inc., No. 1672, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65168, at *18 (E.D. 
Mo. Sep. 13, 2006) (holding a PBM was not a fiduciary under ERISA).  
 190  American Patients First, supra note 156, at 33.  
 191  Id. 
 192  David Balto, Reigning in the Opaque Practices of PBMs and Payers is Long 
Overdue, HILL (July 16, 2018, 7:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/healthcare/397320-
reigning-in-the-opaque-practices-of-pbms-and-payers-is-long-overdue.  
 193  Thomas Sullivan, Maine Set to Repeal Unfair Prescription Drug Prices Act and End 
PBM Discrimination, POL’Y & MED. (May 5, 2018), 
https://www.policymed.com/2011/06/maine-set-to-repeal-unfair-prescription-drug-prices-
act-and-end-pbm-discrimination.html.   
 194  22 M.R.S. § 2699 (repealed 2011).  The National Academy for State and Health 
Policy (“NASHP”) drafted a model act for PBMs.  A MODEL ACT RELATING TO PHARMACY 
BENEFIT MANAGERS (NASHP 2018).  
 195  22 M.R.S. § 2699(2) (repealed 2011). 
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the standards of conduct applicable to a fiduciary in an enterprise of a like 
character and with like aims.”196 
The Maine law has since been repealed, and those in favor of repeal 
argued the law “discouraged PBMs from doing business in the state, which 
was resulting in less competition and higher drug prices.”197  Part of what 
was notable about the gag clause movement was the overwhelming 
consensus across state lines that action needed to be taken.  The same 
cannot be said for laws regarding fiduciary duties.  If legislation were to be 
passed at the federal level, situations like Maine’s would not occur—if 
PBMs owe fiduciary duties in every state, no one state would be seen as 
less desirable.198 
The Trump Administration has thought about implementing fiduciary 
obligations, yet it remains silent about where it currently stands.199  Not 
only would codifying fiduciary duties deter PBMs from partaking in 
practices that are harmful to consumers, it would also establish a 
mechanism to hold PBMs accountable when they fail to put American 
patients first.  Moreover, it would add clarity to the system.  One of the 
system’s problematic features is that it is not always clear who is serving 
whom, whose interests are the priority, and at what cost.  Legislation 
imposing fiduciary duties would help solve these uncertainties and better 
protect consumers. 
2.  Conflicts of Interest 
Not once does the word “conflict” appear in American Patients First, 
yet the PBM system is inundated with conflicts of interest.200  One 
particular source of concern is the rebate and discount system.  A rebate is 
a percentage of the price a PBM receives after a drug is dispensed and the 
pharmacy is reimbursed.201  “[T]he typical PBM business model appears to 
have a very basic conflict of interest” because “the higher the price, the 
 
 196  Id. § 2699(2)(A). 
 197   Sullivan, supra note 193.  DC also attempted to pass a law to hold PBMs as 
fiduciaries; however, a DC Appeals Court found that Title II of the Act, which contained the 
language regarding fiduciary duties, was preempted by ERISA.  Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n 
v. D.C., 613 F.3d 179, 190 (D.C. Cir. 2010); AccessRx Act of 2004, 2003 Bill Text DC B. 
569.  Interestingly, the First Circuit Court of Appeals previously held Maine’s PBM law was 
not preempted by ERISA.  Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 301 (1st Cir. 
2005).  Thus, there is a circuit split regarding whether state law imposing fiduciary duties on 
PBMs conflicts with ERISA.  The Supreme Court declined to review Rowe.  Supreme Court 
Lets Stand Maine Law Regulating Pharmacy Benefit Managers, INS. J. (June 7, 2008), 
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/east/2006/06/07/69265.htm. 
 198  This would also circumvent ERISA issues. 
 199  See American Patients First, supra note 156, at 33. 
 200  Id.  Although it is somewhat alluded to in the section discussing fiduciary duties.  Id. 
 201  Horvath, supra note 38. 
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higher the rebate.”202  As such, the PBM has an incentive to drive up prices, 
which directly conflicts with the PBM’s function of lowering costs for 
consumers.  Similarly, “the more units dispensed, the more revenue a PBM 
gains.”203  This further adds to a PBM’s profit driven mentality, which 
ultimately harms consumers because they are the ones that pay.  Higher 
revenue for a PBM correlates to higher drug prices, which is directly 
proportional to higher prices for consumers.204 
Conflicts of interest also arise when a PBM owns its own pharmacy 
operation or, vice versa, when a pharmacy owns its own PBM.205  This is 
often the result of vertical integration, which occurs when two different 
levels of the supply chain consolidate and offer complementary products.206  
In this situation, the PBM directs all of its business to its pharmacy 
operation instead of exploring whether there is a more cost-efficient option 
for its plan participants elsewhere.207  Once again, the PBM and the 
consumer have misaligned priorities. Consumers want the lowest price, but 
the PBM has no incentive to negotiate and instead forces the consumer to 
use the PBM’s pharmacy.208  Consequently, consumers face further harm 
because these partnerships may restrict their access to certain drugs or 
hinder access to non-affiliate pharmacies.209  An example of this would be 
if Caremark gave preference to CVS and its products instead of 
aggressively negotiating with other pharmacies in order to secure better 
deals for consumers.210 
 
 202  Id. 
 203  Id. 
 204  Id. (“While higher drug prices generate more net revenue for the PBM . . . consumers 
end up paying more in higher prices.”). 
 205  Id. 
 206  Lisl J. Dunlop & Shoshana S. Speiser, Vertical Mergers: A Road Map for Success in 
Healthcare Consolidation, MANATT (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.manatt.com/Insights/New 
sletters/Health-Update/Vertical-Mergers-A-Road-Map-for-Success-in-Health?utm_campaig 
n=Health%20Update%2010.23.18&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Eloqua.  
 207  Horvath, supra note 38. 
 208  Vertical integration is controversial.  The American Medical Association (“AMA”) 
recently opposed the merger of CVS Health and Aetna.  Jennifer Bresnick, AMA: CVS-
Aetna Merger Would Reduce PBM Competition, Raise Prices, HEALTHPAYER INTELLIGENCE 
(Aug. 8, 2018), https://healthpayerintelligence.com/news/ama-cvs-aetna-merger-would-
reduce-pbm-competition-raise-prices.  The AMA argued the merger would result in 
anticompetitive practices and increased prices.  Id. 
 209  Brian S. Feldman, Big Pharmacies are Dismantling the Industry that Keeps US Drug 
Costs Even Sort-of Under Control, QUARTZ (Mar. 17, 2016), https://qz.com/636823/big-
pharmacies-are-dismantling-the-industry-that-keeps-us-drug-costs-even-sort-of-under-
control/. 
 210  This example is not to say this is or is not occurring between Caremark and CVS.  In 
fact, a spokesperson for CVS made the statement, “At our PBM, CVS/Caremark, we 
welcome competition; indeed, our success is predicated on thriving competition in the 
health care marketplace.”  Id. 
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It is unlikely lawmakers will be able to eradicate conflicts of interest 
completely; however, the law could require PBMs to disclose conflicts.  
Maine’s now defunct law that sought to impose fiduciary duties also 
included a provision for disclosing conflicts of interest.211  The law 
stipulated that a PBM “shall notify [a health carrier client] in writing of any 
activity, policy, or practice of the [PBM] that directly or indirectly presents 
any conflict of interest . . .”212  A law like this at the federal level would 
afford more protection to consumers because a conflict of interest that is 
fully disclosed is no longer an issue.  Disclosure would mean consumers 
are aware of factors that may be influencing their plan and would 
subsequently be empowered to “consent” to the conflict or seek an 
alternative provider who better suits their needs.  Gag clauses were 
problematic because they resulted in consumers paying higher out-of-
pocket costs, and arguably more concerning, they were a secret.  It is 
important legislators address the secretive nature of PBMs that give rise to 
conflicts of interest.  Otherwise, consumers will suffer. 
3.  Transparency 
PBMs are mysterious, elusive entities and part of what makes that 
possible is the lack of transparency laws.  In 2017, it was reported, “PBMs 
[do not] reveal the prices they negotiate with their drug manufacturers even 
to their insurance company partners,” which exemplifies the opacity of 
practices.213  Furthermore, there are not many in a position of power to 
challenge PBMs due to the complexity and lack of transparency. 214  When 
it comes to consumers, “[f]ew can even understand how the system 
works—only that [they are] paying through the nose—and those who do 
[cannot] do anything about it.”215  It is this lack of transparency that 
“enables PBMs to enjoy multiple hidden revenue streams” and avoid 
accountability.216 
The lack of information makes it impossible to decipher what a drug 
actually costs versus what the PBM has decided it costs.217  One PBM 
 
 211  22 M.R.S. §2699 (repealed 2011).   
 212  Id.  This is also the language that NASHP recommends for future legislation in its 
sample act.  NASHP, supra note 194. 
 213  William McConnell, Behind the War Between Health Insurers and Pharmacy Benefit 
Managers, STREET (May 30, 2017, 7:45 AM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/14152766/1/ 
behind-the-war-between-health-insurers-and-pharmacy-benefit-managers.html.  
 214  See Ryan Cooper, The Secret Monopoly Behind America’s Outrageous Drug Prices, 
WEEK (Mar. 29, 2017), https://theweek.com/articles/688826/secret-monopoly-behind-
americas-outrageous-drug-prices. 
 215  Id. 
 216  Dayen, supra note 32. 
 217  See id. 
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contract reserved “full authority to determine whether a drug is brand or 
generic without being transparent” and stipulated the PBM could “pocket 
the difference between a brand-drug discount and a generic-drug 
discount.”218  If pricing information were readily available, it could 
potentially deter PBMs from setting prices that are not within a reasonable 
range.  Even if a PBM did not change its practices, at the very least, 
everyone would be able to see what the pricing actually looks like. 
Gag clause legislation does nothing to increase accountability or 
transparency—it only addresses one very specific problem.  Separately, 
various states have passed transparency laws to address this void and better 
protect consumers.  Some states have opted for license and registration 
requirements while others have gone the route of disclosure requirements.  
Arkansas took the former approach and signed a bill into law that requires 
PBMs to be licensed in the state.219  Alternatively, Louisiana took the latter 
approach.220  In Louisiana, PBMs are required to issue “an annual 
transparency report that discloses aggregate data on rebates received from 
drug manufacturers and administrative fees obtained from pharmacists.”221  
Laws like these allow the government to more meaningfully regulate PBMs 
and provide savvy consumers with an opportunity to make informed 
decisions about their pharmacy coverage. 
Despite growing concerns that PBMs add no value to the health care 
system and may be the cause for rising prescription drug costs, it is 
impossible to gauge whether this is true because of non-transparency.222  
The Office of the Inspector General at Health and Human Services shared 
this sentiment indicating, “The lack of transparency raises concerns that 
 
 218 Arielle Kane, The Problem with PBMs, PROGRESSIVE POL’Y INST. (Oct. 3, 2018), 
https://www.progressivepolicy.org/publications/the-problem-with-pbms/ (quoting Bob 
Herman, Inside a Drug Pricing Contract, AXIOS (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.axios.com/in 
side-express-scripts-pbm-contract- 
8be2f09d-cbfa-4275-9855-7bc9c4fcc1a7.html). 
 219  S.B. 2, 91st Gen. Assemb., 2d Extraordinary Sess. (Ark. 2018); H.B. 1010, 91st Gen. 
Assemb., 2d Extraordinary Sess. (Ark. 2018); Joshua Cohen, Improving Drug Price 
Transparency: From Removing Pharmacy Gag Clauses to Reforming the Rebate System, 
FORBES (Oct. 17, 2018, 7:27 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/joshuacohen/2018/10/17/i 
mproving-drug-price-transparency-from-removing-pharmacy-gag-clauses-to-reforming-the-
rebate-system/#47aec202303b.  Other states have similarly adopted licensing and 
registration requirements.  See, e.g., S.B. 117, Gen. Assemb., 16 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2016); S.B. 
1852, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2018). 
 220  S. 282, Gen. Assemb., 2018 Reg. Sess. (La. 2018).  Louisiana also has licensing 
requirements.  S. 283, Gen. Assemb., 2018 Reg. Sess. (La. 2018). 
 221  Cohen supra note 219; S. 283, Gen. Assemb., 2018 Reg. Sess. (La. 2018); see also 
S. 282, Gen. Assemb., 2018 Reg. Sess. (La. 2018).  Another example of a transparency 
report can be found in Washington legislation.  S.B. 5422, 66th Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. 
(Wash. 2019). 
 222  Horvath, supra note 38. 
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sponsors may not always have enough information to oversee the services 
and information provided by PBMs.”223  To address this concern, the 
federal government could adopt legislation that mirrors what the states 
have done.  Other suggestions include fixing drug prices over a contract 
term, or even more radically, creating a national formulary that focuses on 
price and transparency.224  A transparent PBM is not focused on rebates and 
maximizing profit and is instead accountable to plan participants.  
Unquestionably, the system needs to change in order to better serve 
consumers, but proper amendments are impossible unless the system is 
fully understood.225  Transparency laws are a necessary step to ensuring 
American patients are actually put first. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The discussion that has emerged regarding gag clauses is an important 
one.  Gag clause legislation is a crucial first step towards addressing 
problems associated with rising health costs and PBMs, and it is a welcome 
change to see political parties coming together to advance initiatives at both 
the state and federal level.  Nonetheless, banning gag clauses is not a real 
solution for the issue is much larger.  While efforts to block the practice of 
gag clauses are commendable and fully appropriate considering the ethical 
and public policy implications, it is unlikely their removal will make much 
of a difference for Americans in the long run.226 
With or without gag clauses, PBMs will continue to retain immense 
power in the pharmaceutical industry.  While the prohibition of gag clauses 
could potentially save money in the short-term, there is no guarantee those 
savings will carry into the long-term.  With the advent of the pharmacy 
deductible and other tactics in which PBMs can control an individual’s out-
of-pocket expenses over an extended period of time, this may be an 
instance of immediate gratification overshadowing long-term injuries.  
While the banning of gag clauses is an important first step, there is much 
more that needs to be done to achieve the ultimate goal of lowering 
 
 223  Daniel R. Levinson, Concerns With Rebates in the Medicare Part D Program ii, 
DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERV. OFF. INSPECTOR GEN. (Mar. 2011), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/rep 
orts/oei-02-08-00050.pdf. 
 224  Cohen, supra note 219; David Dayen, Want to Bring Down Drug Prices? Go After 
the Middleman, AM. PROSPECT (Aug. 11, 2017), http://prospect.org/article/want-bring-
down-drug-prices-go-after-middleman. 
 225  A Tangled Web, supra note 49, at 27 (“Without this information [about PBM 
practices], identifying opportunities to balance the benefits PBMs offer with their potential 
to drive up drug prices may be impossible.”). 
 226  In a poll conducted by Politico-Harvard, “81 percent [of Americans] favored 
eliminating the gag clauses, but only 42 percent believed it would result in lower drug 
prices.”  Firozi, supra note 11.   
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healthcare costs and better protecting Americans.  Whether it is an 
expansion of gag clause legislation to fortify its protections or subsequent 
actions to counter other problematic practices and features of PBMs, more 
must be done.  Thus, the question “how much will it cost?” is still as 
relevant as ever. 
 
